2012.5.19(土) 開催
第1回 ポリシー・モデリング・ワークショップ
14:00-15:50
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： | 北野泰樹氏 (政策研究大学院大学) |
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： | Disguised Protectionism? Environmental Policy in the Japanese Car Market |
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： | US government criticized Japanese environmental policies for the promotion of eco-friendly car(eco-cars) purchases, e.g. tax exemptions and subsidies, as disguised forms of domestic protection because none of US car models was certified as eco-cars unlike many Japanese car models. The purpose of this paper is to assess whether or not the Japanese environmental policies from 2005 to 2009 were the case of the disguised form of protection that was prohibited under the WTO rule. To achieve this goal, this paper implements counterfactual simulation based on the structural econometric model of multi-product oligopolistic competition to obtain what would happen if the Japanese government introduces an alternative eco-car certification rule that expands the target of the subsidy as suggested by the US government. Simulation results show that although the average fuel economy under the alternative rule is comparable to that under the actual, the alternative is costly in terms of impro ving fuel economy because it requires much larger amount of subsidy in order to achieve the same average fuel economy level as in the actual. Accordingly, the Japanese environmental policies were efficient in terms of improving the environmental quality and thus would not be the case of the disguised protectionism. |
16:10-18:00
|
： | 中林純 氏 (大阪大学) |
|
： |
A Theory of Multi-dimensional Auctions with Non-quasi-linear Scoring Rules (with Makoto Hanazono (Nagoya University) and Masanori Tsuruoka (University of Tokyo))/ 除算方式総合評価落札方式の理論分析 |
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： | We establish a model of scoring auctions in which the assumption that the scoring function be quasi-linear is relaxed. In particular, we examine the scoring auctions with price-quality ratio (PQR) scoring rules, which is another class of widespreadly used scoring functions. |
Verifying the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in scoring auctions with PQR rules, we demonstrate that equivalence fails in both expected exercised scores and bidders’ expected payoffs if scoring rules are on the basis of PQR: The procurement buyer obtains higher utility in SS while bidders earn higher expected profits in FS auctions.
| 開催日時 | 2012.5.19／14：00／18：00 |
|---|---|
| 講演者 | 北野泰樹 氏 他... |
| 会 場 | 政策研究大学院大学 4階 会議室4B |
| 参加費 | 無料 |
| 言 語 | 日本語 |
