Policing the Peace after Yugoslavia: 
Police Reform between External Imposition and Domestic Reform

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ABSTRACT
Since the mid-1990s, a plethora of international organizations—from the UN and OSCE to the European Union and NATO—have been extensively involved in the reform of police forces across the post-conflict regions of former Yugoslavia. The various international actors have employed a diverse tool kit of police reform, from creating new police forces from scratch to reforming existing, ethnically divided forces. This paper will trace the different efforts in post-conflict settings by discussing policing by international actors, efforts at imposing police reform, post-conflict police assistance and change to policing through conditionality, drawing on the rich empirical record from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Despite these extensive efforts, the results have been modest. Lacking clear international or European standards, police reform has been the subject to uneven and changing expectations and contradictory demands.

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AGENDA

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Introduction

Police Forces across Central and Southeastern Europe have experienced a fundamental transformation since the fall of Communism over two decades ago. The transition from authoritarian single-party rule to multiparty democracy necessitated a profound change of the police: enforcing the rule of law, protecting human rights and not viewing citizens as potential threats and subordinates. New challenges arose in addition, such as organized crime, often linked to political power centers, discrimination of minorities (esp. Roma) and political violence. This plethora of needs which drove police reform in Central and Southeastern Europe has been compounded by the large scale violence which most countries emerging from Yugoslavia experienced in the process of the wars of Yugoslav succession. Police forces during the wars and conflicts were often the main source of violence, discrimination and ‘ethnic cleansing’. They were not embodying the ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of force by the state’: Run by states against minorities, by secessionists against other ethnic groups and political opponents, being not legitimate, holding no monopoly over the use of force, they became subservient to new nationalist political elites and their ranks swelled with paramilitaries who had little or no understanding of policing. The Serbian police included for example the notorious Unit for Special Operations (Jedinica za specijalne operacije, JSO), also known as Red Berets, which included members of paramilitary units from Croatia and Bosnia and committed war crimes in all three wars and whose members assassinated Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić in March 2003. The police in Serbia as an example for one of the most politicized police forces in the region was directly controlled by president Slobodan Milošević until his fall in 2000 and served as his praetorian guard against domestic dissent and was a key actor in ethnic cleansing in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo during the wars.

For their central role during the conflicts police reform has been understood to be a pillar of post-conflict reconstruction, not only in former Yugoslavia, but also in other ethnic and civil conflicts from Northern Ireland to Sudan. The reforms which are initiated in the post-conflict period have to meet six particular challenges. Firstly, they need to penalize and ideally remove police officers who have been involved in serious breaches of human rights during the conflict. Second, former combatants need to transition to civilian jobs and police forces are often the obvious employers. Third, police forces need to be made more representative of the larger population composition, which in most cases entails increasing the share of minority members in the police force. Fourth, police reform is necessary in order to allow for the return of minorities and to provide a secure environment in which democratic elections can take place. Fifth, police reform is inherently political and often controversial as the structure of the police reinforces the political structures after the war. These institutions, such as regional autonomy, are often integral part of the peace settlement. Finally, the policing practice needs to be professionalized and reformed. While all aspects seek to transform police forces from a cause of conflict to a legitimate

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4 On the structure of the Serbian police during the 1990s see Budimir Babović, Analysis of Regulations Regarding Responsibility for Control of the Interior Ministry of the Republic Serbia, 2.4.2003. Exhibit 465, Case IT-02-54-T, Slobodan Milošević, ICTY.
representative of an inclusive state to maintain peace, the different priorities often pull the reform efforts into contradictory directions.

International intervention in the form of assistance, advice, policing, mentoring, training, enforcement and coercion shaped the evolution of post-conflict policing in former Yugoslavia. It is this international intervention into policing that is the focus of this paper. This does not include general assistance and advice provided to state authorities in conducting policing or reforming the police, but more concerted external intervention, focusing particularly on the post-conflict environment. In particular, we will focus on four aspects of international intervention in police reform which will be discussed in detail: First, we will look at international policing, where international organizations exercised executive policing functions and re-build police forces from scratch. Second, we will explore externally imposed police reforms, i.e. when changes to the police structure are primarily driven by external actors, even if they are formally implemented by local institutions. These two first forms of external intervention are particular to the (semi-)protectorates in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where international actors have held a broad range of competences. Third, we will discuss short-term post conflict assistance which includes measures that have assisted governments to reform police forces in response to a conflict, as has been the case in Southern Serbia and Macedonia. Finally, we will explore how conditionality of the European Union has sought to facilitate the reform of police forces, taking the example of Bosnia.

In addition to the European Union, most international intervention in the context of policing have been carried out by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations. Beyond these three core actors, bilateral donors have shaped the police reform agenda, as has NATO, which through a lead role in peace-keeping has often held executive police competences, in particular through the KFOR mission in Kosovo.

As we shall see, the record of this experience has been mixed. While conflicts have ended, bloated militarized police forces have become more professional and inclusive, political influence remains strong. Furthermore, external intervention has been struggling to convince local authorities to ‘buy into’ the reform processes. As such, police reform has shared greater similarities with other aspects of public administration reform, rather than defense reform which has generally been more successful due to clearer standards of armed forces and the lead role of NATO in the process.\(^5\) In particular, there has been a frequent disconnect between the emphasis on technical assistance by external actors and the political relevance of police forces and the content of the reform process.

1. International Policing

International policing constitutes the highest degree of external imposition. It encompasses both an executive role for international police officers, including the power to arrest citizens, and the complete reconstruction of a new local police force. Despite extensive external involvement in policing, international police officers have only actively conducted policing in Kosovo and in Eastern Slavonia. The rarity of such extensive external involvement, including beyond the Western Balkans, is hardly

\(^5\) On this for Bosnia see the research project of the author and Gülnur Aybet on EU and NATO state-building in Bosnia, http://intbosnia.wordpress.com/.
surprising. States are unlikely to complete relinquish one of its core functions and international actors are generally ill-prepared to provide executive policing—from linguistic and cultural obstacles to the large number of international police officers required. In Kosovo, external policing became a necessity as after the ceasefire negotiated between NATO and the Yugoslav government in June 1999 all Yugoslav and Serbian security personal withdrew from the province, leaving a complete power-vacuum behind in Kosovo. Due to the apartheid-style policies of Slobodan Milošević’s Serbia, few Albanians remained in the security forces and most Kosovo Serbs in the security forces were unwilling to remain in Kosovo under international auspices for the fear of retribution by Albanians. Thus, Kosovo lacked any state structures and institutions as KFOR soldiers entered the region. However, KFOR soldiers competed against the Kosovo Liberation Army which also sought to fill the vacuum created by the Serbian state withdrawal.6 In this environment, policing was first carried out by peacekeepers with little training and capacities in regular police duties. As a consequence, KFOR was unable to prevent large scale revenge attacks against Serbs and other minorities by radical Albanians, taking the lives of up to a thousand persons during the summer of 1999 and the expulsion of a majority of Serbs and most Roma from Kosovo.7

Prior to the establishment of an international police force in Kosovo, the only regional experience with an international police force and the complete reconstruction of a police force had been in Eastern Slavonia. Eastern Slavonia was the eastern most region of Croatia bordering Serbia and the only part of the self-declared mini-state of the Republic of Serbian Krajina left in the fall of 1995 after the successful Croatian military operations Flash (Bljesak) and Lightening (Oluja). The region came under temporary international administration in late 1995 through the Erdut Agreement which foresaw the reintegration of the region into Croatia. While the Croatian Serb authority had not disappeared, as the Serbian state had in Kosovo, the overwhelming military victory of the Croatian state elsewhere placed the local Serb authorities in weak bargaining position. As a result, the local Serb forces, including the police which emerged out of paramilitary units during the Croat war in 1991/2, were disbanded and the entire region demilitarized.8 In its place, the UN mission established the Transitional Authority Police Force (TAPF), a multiethnic police that was formed with assistance from the Croat state institutions and the local Serb authorities with rough parity of Serbs and Croats.9 The TAPF eventually consisted of 811 Serb, 815 Croat officers and 52 from other ethnic groups. The force was trained by the UN who also maintained observers in all local police stations. In addition, a 50 person special international police unit existed in parallel with the local police, established under UN mandate.10 They were forced to accept an executive role for the UN mission in the region (UNTAES) which would oversee the reintegration of the region in Croatia. The international police was in Eastern Slavonia was able to make some high-profile arrests during the UN mandate, but never played more than an

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8 Art. 3, Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, 12.11.1995.
10 Ibid, p. 46.
auxiliary role to the reforms of the local police force. By December 1997 the responsibility over the police was transferred to Croatian government after the government promised to maintain the ethnic composition, but all other special arrangements or international involvement ended.11

In Kosovo, the international policing slowly emerged after the entry of KFOR. The two main policing structures were the internationally staffed civilian police force (CIVPOL) and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), which was recruited locally, but remained under UN control until 2005.12 Local political institutions at the Kosovo-level were only established in 2001, following the promulgation of the UN imposed Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo that established the ‘Provisional Institutions of Self-Government’ (PISG) and general elections. Furthermore, the UN was reluctant to relinquish policing competences to the new authorities due to the sensitivity of policing, in particular when it came to retaining minority members among its ranks and protecting Serbs and minorities (esp. Roma) from attacks.

The CIVPOL was the first civilian police force to take over from KFOR in the months following the end of the war. Unlike the KFOR, however, it was unable to deploy in the immediate aftermath of the war and it would take CIVPOL up to a year to reach its planned strength. The mission was first established with quickly transfer of members of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and in 1999 counted only 1,800 police officers. By 2000, its number had more than doubled to 4,450, at which level it approximately remained until 2004.13 Among the international police officers, approximately two thirds formed part of the CIVPOL, while the remainder constituted special police units and the border police.14 The reasons for the slow-build up of the international police mission are in part specific to Kosovo and in part representative of a broader problem of international police missions. UNMIK gained the mandate to administer the police mission only at the beginning of international deployment and was thus unable to plan for such a mission ahead of time.15 A general problem, experienced frequently with civilian missions in post-conflict intervention, has been the deployment gap. Civilian members to missions cannot be drawn up as soldiers and in particular qualified professionals are often not readily available for deployment. This pertains specifically to policing as few countries can spare large numbers of police officers. This gap has lead to often low standards among the international officials. Reports of the executive and non-executive UN police missions in Kosovo and Bosnia frequently noted that police officers were at times unable to speak English or even to drive—both formal requirement—or came from backgrounds that raised legitimate doubts over the good policing practices they might be bringing to the countries.16 In Kosovo, some 46 countries contributed to CIVPOL.

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13 Ibid., p. 158.
15 Wilson, op. cit., p. 159.
in March 2004, with the largest contributors being from the USA, India, Germany, and Jordan, but also including police officers hailing from Zimbabwe. In addition to providing civilian policing and to taking over these functions from KFOR, the international police mission had the explicit goal to prepare the transition to the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) that would eventually take over from CIVPOL. The first recruits of the KPS were already trained in 1999 and the ratio of KPS to CIVPOL police officers increased steadily, with KPS overtaking the number of international police officers by 2002. The KPS was recruited by the UN and trained by the OSCE in a program that was similar to later training programs in Macedonia and Southern Serbia, discussed below, involving 20 weeks training at a police academy and followed by 15 weeks of field training. The number of KPS police officers reached 5,700 in March 2004, more than twice the number of international police officers.

In recruitment UNMIK paid particular attention to secure the adequate representation of minorities to help not just build an inclusive police force, but also to secure the legitimacy of the new institutions among the Serb community that had remained skeptical and at times outright hostile towards these emerging Kosovo institutions. In this regard, KPS was successful as by 2003, 84% of its members were hailing from the Albanian community, 9% from Serbian background and 7% from other communities, slightly overrepresenting minorities. This careful distribution, however, should not be mistaken for a multiethnic police force. As Serbs and Albanians in particular live in segregated areas, the police tended to reflect the local demographics and contain few members of a different group in any given region. Despite this success in terms of minority recruitment, the KPS, together with CIVPOL and KFOR, however, took a serious blow to their legitimacy in March 2004 when three days of rioting by extremist Albanians resulted in the torching of Serb Orthodox churches, houses and the displacement of several thousand Serbs. The international presence itself became a target of the mob violence with around 60 members from each KFOR, CIVPOL and KPS injured. The violence and the inability of KPS to effectively stem the attacks revealed a number of weaknesses of the international police effort: the officers' pay and morale was low and training and equipment for crowd control was limited. More importantly, the failure to prevent the violence disclosed larger structural weaknesses of international policing. Coordination within KFOR and between KFOR, the UN police and KPS was minimal and lines of authorities were confused. Similarly, none of the security providers appeared to be equipped and trained for large-scale crowd control and civil disturbances. While the March 2004 would not be repeated, it undermined the international presence and also openly challenged the UN mission altogether. With 50,000 rioters participating and targeting not only minorities, but also the international police and security forces, the honeymoon between the international peace mission and the Albanian majority was over.

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17 For a list of participating countries, see http://www.unmikonline.org/civpol/factsfigs.htm.
18 Wilson, op. cit., p.160.
20 There are no firm population numbers as no reliable census has been held in Kosovo since 1981, but it is generally assumed that the share of Albanians of the population of Kosovo is close to 90%. Ibid., p. 16.
21 Ibid., p.14
22 Ibid., p. 15.
23 Ibid, p. 25
popular support and legitimacy not to slide into an escalation of violence. The support the UN and KFOR had enjoyed in 1999 had dissipated by March 2004. It was this crisis that lead to the process which paved the way to Kosovo’s independence in February 2008.

After the riots, the KPS gained in autonomy from the UN came under control of Kosovo authorities in 2005. Shortly before independence, the KPS had 7,124 police officers, 6,082 Albanians, 746 Serbs and 414 from other communities. This distribution meant that Serbs remained part of this institution and were well represented. In response to the declaration of independence in 2008, however, most Serb officers in the KPS walked out of their jobs, coinciding with a general Serb boycott of Kosovo institutions. By July 2009 most Serb officers returned to work for KPS. During the transition towards independence and as EULEX took over from most policing activities from the UN, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section, the international civilian police was gradually phased out. The EU rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) had been under discussion since 2005 but only began operating after Kosovo’s independence in 2008.

2. Internationally Imposed Police Reform

Short of taking over executive police functions or forming a police force from scratch, international actors have most commonly shaped the police in post-conflict states of the Western Balkans through a combination of advice and imposition. International organizations have exercised strong control over the police particularly in Bosnia and in Kosovo after independence, albeit without a full executive mandate. This approach combines an international presence with limited executive and oversight competences with a functional local administration. Unlike international assistance to local authorities, which we will discuss next, or a direct international executive role, this hybrid creates inherent tensions between national and local authorities and international actors imposing or ‘suggesting’ particular reforms to the police force. Unlike international policing, the focus is not on establishing public safety and security, but to transform the existing police structures. These reforms are often focused on making the police more representative of minority groups, ensuring that the police protects minorities, in particular refugees returning to their homes, and to reducing direct political influence and police abuse.

Probably the most substantial international effort in the region took place in Bosnia. Initially, the UN-lead International Police Task Force (IPTF) had equipped only a weak mandate to advise, monitor and observe the local police in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord (Annex 11). The mission was caught between conflicting visions of the

25 Caplan notes how an executive police mandate was only possible due to domestic support in Kosovo for the international presence. Caplan, op. cit., p. 51.
26 Judah, op. cit., p. 95.
29 By late 2009, UN still had 8 international police officers in Kosovo as part of the Rule of Law office which facilitated the work of EULEX in Northern Kosovo were Serb institutions had initially refused to cooperate with EULEX. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo,” UN Security Council, 30.9.2009, S/2009/497, p. 17.
30 While numbers of the international police declined, there were still around 2,000 international police officers stationed in Kosovo on the eve of independence in 2008. Džihić, Kramer, op. cit., p. 8.
USA and the West European countries involved in defining its mission, leaving it “weak by a mixture of accident and design,” as Richard Caplan has argued. The impotence of IPTF became apparent in 1996 when the hand-over of Serb-held suburbs of Sarajevo to the Bosniak-Croat dominated Federation lead to most Serbs being forced out by their own authorities and large areas being burnt down under the passive eye of the international presence, including the fledgling IPTF.

The mission was staffed at its peak by 1,800 international police officers, whose task initially it was to monitor the work of the different local police forces, to participate in joint patrols, provide training and advise authorities. This restrictive mandate reflects the broader limitation of the civilian aspects of the international mission in Bosnia in the first phases of the international mission. While the military presence had a more robust mandate and quickly established itself, the peacekeeping force IFOR, succeeded by SFOR in 1996, initially refrained from taking over any policing rule beyond conventional peace-keeping tasks, unlike KFOR in Kosovo. This was particularly striking in the unwillingness to arrest suspected war criminals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Just as the mandate of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was enhanced by the so-called Bonn Powers to exercise executive powers in all domains of the civilian implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the IPTF received additional powers in the UN Security Council Resolution 1088 in 1996. The resolution allowed the IPTF to vet police officers and to bar police officers for human rights abuses. Subsequently, IPTF officers were co-located in local police stations, which enhanced the international supervision of policing practices. A further result of this change of mandate was a large vetting program, which was facilitated by two bilateral agreements with each of the two entities, the first one was signed with the Federation in 1996 and the second with the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska, RS) in 1998. The IPTF both monitored the police throughout Bosnia, including participating in patrols, being stationed in local police stations and conducted the vetting process. This process was aimed reducing the high number of police officers and eliminating police officers from the services which had either breached human rights in service or otherwise had made grave misrepresentations in the vetting processes to the UN. This process included a test for existing police officers, confirmation that they were not publically indicted by the ICTY, or had a known criminal record. During this process, which was completed in a rush in 2002, the number of police officers was reduced from 44,750 in 1995 (32,750 in the Federation and 12,000 in the RS) to 11,500 in the Federation and 8,500 in the RS within a few years. In parallel with the overall reduction of the number of police, the different police forces were also required to include members from non-dominant communities. Considering that there were 12 territorial police forces (one for each of ten cantons of the Federation, one for the RS

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31 Ibid., p. 48
35 Palmer, op. cit., p. 178.
36 Ibid, p.177.
and one in the district of Brčko), non-dominant groups included for example Bosniaks and Croats in the RS, Serbs in all cantons of the Federation, but also Bosniaks in Croat dominated cantons and vice versa. In the 1996 agreement, the Federation committed itself to recruit a Serb share of the police corresponding to the pre-war census, setting aside 28% of posts for Serbs. The RS was unwilling to commit to the census result as basis for recruitment, as this would have meant that nearly half of all police officers were not Serbs. Instead, the turnout of non-Serbs in the first local elections in 1997 served as the base line, resulting in a quota of 20% reserved for non-Serbs. The IPTF sought to recruit new minority officers by offering refresher courses for former police officers among IDPs and refugees, redeploying police officers to region of origin and new recruits.\(^{37}\) Despite concerted efforts by IPTF, the numbers remained well below the targets. The first non-Serbs only joined the RS police in 1999 and the number had not exceeded 5% by 2002. The numbers in the Federation were only slightly more encouraging: In 1999 less than 1.5% of police officers were neither Croats or Bosniaks with the number rising to 15.5% by 2002, but still remaining around half of the target.\(^{38}\) Although the UN Mission in Bosnia (UNMBiH) declared the police reform successful and the police ‘fit for Europe’, international intervention did not end.\(^{39}\) It would appear that the EU who succeeded the UN in Bosnia did not deem the police sufficiently ‘fit for Europe.’ The EU Police Mission (EUPM) operated with a much reduced foot print (400 instead of 1,800 international police officers) and a more limited mandate. As a result, it focused its efforts on the managerial level of the police.\(^{40}\) EUPM was unable to de-certify police officers, but instead the Commissioner in charge of EUPM could recommend the dismissal of police officers to the OHR. Although this structure was more complex, as the dismissals by the OHR were not open to judicial redress, this structure resulted in great powers of the EU mission, despite having a formally reduced mandate.\(^{41}\) In the Bosnian context two experiences stand out: Brčko and Mostar.\(^{42}\) In Mostar, a small police contingent (up to 182 international officers) of the West European Union (WEU) assisted the EU effort to unify the city between July 1994 and October 1996 following the end of the conflict between the Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat forces. The goal of the WEU mission was to provide security and to forge a unified police out of the two ethnically divided police forces. In effect, when the EU and WEU mission ended in 1996 and handed over to the OHR and the UN, little had been achieved.\(^{43}\) The record in Brčko was more successful. Here international engagement was extended as the city came under full international protectorate in 1997 and an international arbitration transformed it into a separate district by 1999. Although the formal structures—the IPFT in combination with the OHR were formally the same as elsewhere in Bosnia, the intervention was considerably more advanced. Brčko alone,

\(^{37}\) Ibid., p. 180.
\(^{38}\) Florian Bieber, Post-War Bosnia (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), pp.73-74, pp. 82-83.
\(^{39}\) Donais, op. cit, p. 173.
\(^{40}\) Palmer, op.cit. p. 190.
a small municipality, 250 international police officers were deployed, much more than
any other region of the country. In addition, the international supervisor of district
established a multi-ethnic police force, based on pre-existing police officers, but with
a new structure.\textsuperscript{44} As a result, the police force of Brčko has been considerably more
diverse and professional than in most other regions of Bosnia. Overall, however, the
record of both the IPTF and the EUPM is widely considered to be modest. While the
number of police officers has been drastically reduced and some human rights
offenders were weeded out, the number of minority police officers remained
disappointingly low and many serious human rights violators remained beyond the
reach of the IPTF. De-certified police officers could be employed by the Ministry of
Interiors in non-policing roles, former police officers with a problematic background
remained part of the internal security apparatus.\textsuperscript{45} The IPTF only slowly reached its
operating staffing (reaching its assigned capacity only in 1997) and its members have
been criticized for low policing standards and involvement in prostitution.\textsuperscript{46}
Some of these challenges have been replicated by two similar EU police missions,
namely the Proxima mission which assisted police reform in Macedonia between late
2003 and late 2005 and the EULEX mission in Kosovo which formally took over
most rule of law related competences from the UN in late 2008.
Proxima succeeded earlier NATO and EU military missions in the aftermath of the
2001 conflict. It aimed at promoting a “depolitized, decentralized, multi-ethnic
police.”\textsuperscript{47} Unlike IPTF, it lacked any ability to dismiss police officials and was mostly
focused on monitoring police officers, being at least initially co-located with
Macedonian police units in the regions populated by the Albanian population and
providing advice and support to the government reform agenda. However, the 200
member strong mission exercised considerable influence by its mere presence.
Proxima lasted only for two years after it was forced to close down in 2005 due to
government reservations about the impact of the mission on country’s chance of EU
accession. Upon closing its mission, the EU handed back over to the OSCE, which
had earlier been the lead organization on policing. A key feature and flaw of the
Proxima mission, as Isabelle Ioannides notes, has been the extensive infighting
between the mission and other EU institutions in Macedonia (i.e. the EC delegation,
the EUSR) and other international actors (OSCE, bi-lateral donors), which
significantly undermined the mission.\textsuperscript{48}
Similar institutional infighting and uncertainty undermined the EU’s rule of law
mission EULEX. While the mission was formally set up shortly before Kosovo’s
declaration of independence to support Kosovo’s judiciary and police, it remained
passive and inactive for months after independence as different EU member states
took conflicting positions on Kosovo’s independence and a UN Security Council
Resolution to grant the mission formal powers failed to materialize primarily due to
Russian objections. Only a six-point plan by UN Secretary General with Serbia in late

\textsuperscript{44} Valery Perry, \textit{Democratic Ends and Democratic Means. Peace Implementation Strategies and
International Intervention Options in Bosnia and Herzegovina}. Unpublished PhD Dissertation. George
Mason University, 2006, pp. 172-3.
\textsuperscript{45} Palmer, op., cit., p.179.
\textsuperscript{46} Donais, op. cit. p. 186; Caplan, op. cit., p. 55.
\textsuperscript{47} Isabelle Ioannides, “The EU Police Mission Proxima : Testing the ‘European’ Approach to Building
(June 2006), p. 72.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., pp. 80-81.
2008 paved the path to the mission’s deployment. In exchange, it had to remain status-neutral, instead of supporting Kosovo’s independence as originally intended and operated under the framework of the 1999 Security Council Resolution 1244. In addition, Serb enclaves remained beyond the reach of Kosovo institutions that were linked only to the EU and UNMIK, but not to the Kosovo Ministry of Interior or Justice. The compromise with Belgrade undermined the legitimacy of EULEX in the eyes of many Albanians and raised the prospect of similar challenges as EUPM had faced in Bosnia and UNMIK in Kosovo. EULEX reached its full operation strength of 2,569 (1,651 international and 918 local staff) by April 2009. Unlike Proxima, the mission holds some executive powers, however even beyond its mandate, the limited sovereignty of Kosovo grants international actors significant informal powers. It primary executive roles is to act as a second line of defense in case of serious incidents, i.e. if the Kosovo Police Service is unable to resolve the incident and before KFOR becomes involved. Another particularity of EULEX in comparison to other police missions is its broader mission which includes police, justice and customs. In particular the link between support for police, prosecutors and judges marks a more comprehensive understanding of police reform than other regional efforts.

3. Short-term Post-Conflict Police Reform

A less intrusive form of international assistance than discussed in the previous section is a set of measures to address the ethnic composition of the police in the post-conflict context. Generally speaking, police forces tend to be unrepresentative of the wider population in the immediate aftermath of conflict. In particular minorities, especially if they were party to the conflict, are usually reduced to a few token representatives, if at all. This challenge was confronted by all police forces across the region, and thus constituted a core feature of all international efforts in former Yugoslavia. However, in two cases, Macedonia and Serbia, the international engagement was less sustained and intrusive. A particular challenge of increasing the number of police officers from minority communities is the tension with some long-term reform goals. The quick increase of minority members in the police force often does not facilitate the professionalism of the police, but might crucially enhance the legitimacy of the police which takes priority in an environment of low trust after conflict.

These challenges were particularly pertinent in Southern Serbia and Macedonia, which experienced two low-scale ethnic insurgencies in 2001. Two interlinked Albanian rebel movements, the National Liberation Army (UÇK) and the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medvedja and Bunjanovac (UÇPMB), launched attacks against Macedonian and Serbian security forces in 2001 and 2000 respectively. The UÇK sought for greater rights of Albanians in Macedonia, including quotas for Albanians and a greater role in the government. While it also argued for territorial autonomy or federalism, it abandoned this agenda in the face of international opposition. The

51 Džihić, Kramer, op. cit., p. 15.
UÇPMB sought to detach the three Albanian inhabited municipalities from Serbia to join a future independent Kosovo. Unlike the wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo, these conflicts did not escalate and the number of victims remained small. The settlement in both cases included an important component of police reform which would sought to improve the participation of minorities in the police force.

In Serbia, the Ćović plan—named after the Serbian deputy Prime Minister Nebojša Ćović who took a lead role in negotiating and implementing the agreement—was put forth by the Serbian government with assistance of NATO and the OSCE brought the conflict to an end, and received broad international financial support. Police reform was one of four core aspects of the strategy to end the conflict, together with economic development, increasing the employment of Albanians in public administration and publically owned enterprises, as well as the introduction of Serbian security forces in the five kilometer buffer zone around Kosovo that had been previously de-militarized and became a staging ground for the UÇPMB.

In Macedonia, the conflict ended through the Ohrid Framework Agreement, negotiated between the largest Macedonian and Albanian parliamentary parties under NATO and EU auspices in August 2001. As in Serbia, police reform and in particular the proportional representation of Albanians in the police force constitutes a core pillar of the agreed reforms.

In the initial phases in both Macedonia and Serbia, the lead international organization for police reform was the OSCE, which had established missions in both countries. In Serbia, the OSCE trained police officers in a three-stage model. Very short five day and five week courses were aimed at former police officers, including Albanians which had been dismissed or resigned during the Milošević era. These refresher courses sought to quickly signaling change in the region and to build confidence in the immediate aftermath of the conflict and were based on training equal numbers of Albanians and Serbs with a total of 80 police officers receiving training. The more sustained third pillar of OSCE-organized police training focused on the establishment of a new multiethnic local police force. The training was directed at former UÇPMB fighters without a criminal record and civilians, in particular Albanians. In addition, current police officers also received training. Of the 375 persons trained in the first year, nearly two thirds were Albanians (239) and most of the remainder Serbs and two Roma. By late 2003, Albanians constituted a similar proportion of (270 of 430) police officers in the three municipalities.

As a short term post-conflict program, it did not result in a permanent mechanism to recruit, promote and retain Albanian police officers and more then two years after the of the conflict, the number of Albanians in the police still remained well below the population share, in particular in Preševo were Albanians constitute an overwhelming majority of 89.1%. Similarly, the local police units were often overshadowed by the special police unit Žandarmerija—a militarized police unit based on the model of the Italian Carabinieri. Contentious police operations are carried out by the Žandarmerija rather than the local multiethnic police and the highly visible and armed appearance of

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53 The plan was officially know as the Program and Plan for the resolution of the crisis in the municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa and was passed by the Federal Yugoslav Government in February 2001. Koordinaciono telo za opštine Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveđa, Program i Plan rešavanja krize u opštinama Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveđa, 8.2.2001.


the unit in the region has been a source of contention between the Serbian state and the Albanian minority ever since 2001.\(^{57}\) Similarly police officers who had served in Kosovo during the conflict in 1998/9 had retained their posts in the region, which has heightened tensions.\(^{58}\)

The police reform in Macedonia after the end of the conflict shared many features with the experience in South Serbia. The goal of the international engagement in Macedonia, first led by the OSCE, which has had a Spill-over mission in the country since 1992, was two-fold: first to increase minority confidence and participation in the police force and second, to allow for a return of the ‘state’ to regions which had been controlled by the Albanian insurgents. As in Southern Serbia, the priority of the OSCE engagement was the rapid increase of Albanians (and to a lesser degree other minority members) in the police force. The OSCE thus trained 1,000 non-Macedonian police officers by July 2003 and supported efforts by the government to make the police force representative of the population composition by 2004.\(^{59}\) By 2006, the number of Albanians in the police force had increased to 16% from 2% prior to the conflict, a dramatic increasing in a short period of time, but still well below the population share.\(^{60}\) In particular in the higher ranks of the police hierarchy, only few non-Macedonians were represented, well below the proportional representation aimed for.\(^{61}\) In a first step, the OSCE organized brief 12 week training courses, followed by six months field training for mostly new Albanian police officers to boost the number of non-Macedonian police officers by 500 in the first year after the end of the conflict. In addition to recruiting minority police officers, the OSCE also dispatched police advisors and confidence building monitors to ‘crisis areas’ to assist at restoring trust between the police and estranged Albanian communities.\(^{62}\)

Despite the ambitious goals of international intervention and a largely cooperative local government, the transformation of the police has been slow and cumbersome. Not only did the minority representation in the police not research the share in the general population, but other aspects lagged behind. A new police law which would allow the election of police chiefs by local authorities was only passed in 2006 and not according to the Badinter voting principle that requires not just majority consent, but also a support of a majority of all minority community MPs. Furthermore, the law was not implemented for well over year after being passed.\(^{63}\)

In both Serbia and Macedonia, the interethnic conflict triggered first a localized and minority-focused police reform, but the international engagement led to reform

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\(^{61}\) By 2006, 14.56% of all police officers were Albanians, but only 10.2% of top posts. See Sali Ramadani, “Power Sharing and Internal Security,” Power Sharing and the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (Skopje: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2008), pp. 120-1.

\(^{62}\) As many Albanians saw esp. Western officials as implicitly supportive the international observers could contribute to building tru-st between police and citizens where this might not have been possible elsewhere. Lesja, op.cit, pp. 187, 189-90.

initiatives which had a broader scope, encompassing the entire policing sector. While this expansion could be considered a form of ‘mission creep’ it more accurately reflects two aspects which emerged during the initial police reform focused on interethnic relations. First, without structural changes to the police, including a broad reform agenda to emphasize community policing, modern policing methods and human rights, the inclusion of minority members in the police force is unlikely to shift the overall relationship between the state and its citizens, including its minorities. Second, expanding the remit of reform has been an effective strategy particularly in Macedonia to secure broad popular support, as measures only focused on improving interethnic relations are often viewed by citizens from minority communities as privileging minorities over majorities.

4. Police through Conditionality

The latest form of international intervention in the structure of policing in the Western Balkans has been through the policy of conditionality of the European Union. The EU had acted as a donor for numerous police reform initiatives in the region, in particular through the assistance programs of the European Commission, such as PHRARE and later CARDS. However, it only became a key player in the field in 2002/3. First, the EU, as noted above, took over the UN police mission in Bosnia, followed by the EU police mission in Macedonia. These efforts followed the established pattern of post-conflict assistance and the particular nature of the European Union and its offer of membership to the countries of the Western Balkans initially had little impact on the nature of these missions. However, in Bosnia, the thrust of police reform after 2003 was driven not by the EU Police Mission, but by political conditionality of the EU, supplemented by pressure of the Office of the High Representative. As neither IPTF and even less the EUPM were able to impose a structural reform of the police sector and no such reform was foreseen in the Dayton Peace Agreement, any further reforms had to take a different point of departure. The reforms, however, were deemed necessary by both the OHR and the EU due the high administrative cost of policing, the lack of coordination between the different police authorities and the close links to ethnonationalist power structures. EU accession provided for a starting point to pursue further reform: The rule of law constitutes an integral aspect of the enlargement process and both human rights and a functional democracy became a core requirement for all future EU member states at the Copenhagen summit in 1993. Modernizing and reforming the police was thus on the EU agenda in view of its enlargement to the Western Balkans. The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) and the subsequent Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with countries of the region did not initially entail any particular direction these reforms should take. However, in the case of Bosnia, the tool of the SAA would become a key engine—albeit ultimately leading to failure—for police reform. Police reform became part of the international effort to reduce the vast competences of the entities to promote a viable central state. In parallel, the entity armies were gradually reduced and eventually replaced by a state level army, similarly security services and border control shifted from entity to state control after 2000. Lacking a foundation in the

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64 Trivunovic, op. cit., p. 174; Lesja, op. cit., p. 188.
Dayton Peace Agreement, Paddy Ashdown, High Representative from 2002 to 2006, encouraged the European Commission to set police reform as a requirement for signing an SAA. In parallel the OHR established a Police Restructuring Commission which was to draft a plan for police reform under the chairmanship of the former Belgium Prime Minister Winfried Martens. As the commission was under pressure to propose a police reorganization where financial and legislative oversight would rest solely with the state and police regions would cut across the entity boundaries, the Commission’s works was rejected by the Serb Republic which jealously guarded its autonomy. This conflict resulted in the failure of the Commissions proposal to be mutually accepted and a protracted conflict between the OHR and EU on one side and the Serb Republic on the other hand.

As the European Union set three criteria in regard to police reform as conditions for signing the SAP, police reform continued to dominate debates in Bosnia until 2008. The EU insisted in its conditionality that

“i) all legislative and budgetary competencies for all police matters must be vested at the state level, ii) no political interference with operational policing and iii) functional local police areas must be determined by technically policing criteria where operational command is exercised at the local level.”

Conceptually, conditionality offers a strong incentive for reform, not just in the domain of policing: support for EU membership runs high in the Western Balkans and conditionality has been used effectively by the EU to induce reform in the first two rounds of enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. What set police reform apart from other forms of conditionality, however, was the basis for these conditions. The EU lacks an acquis communautaire for police matters as these remain firmly within the remit of member states. As a result, the EU could not draw on specific requirements, in particularly not in regard to the structure of the police. For example, in its informal guidelines for future member states on the administrative structures required to implement the acquis and thus join the EU, the police is scarcely mentioned, and mostly limited to requiring an “accountable, reliable and effective police organisation, which co-operates fully internally, is essential for adequate implementation of the acquis related to cooperation in the field of Justice, freedom and security, and in particular for the fight against organised crime and new types of crime.”

These vague principles stood in contrast with the specific requirements spelled out for Bosnia, compounded by the fact that numerous member states organized their police forces in structures which differ noticeably from those proposed by the EU for Bosnia.

Repeated efforts by three High Representatives were unable to successfully usher the police reform through and instead police reform slowed down not only EU accession, but other aspects of political reform. While Bosnian elites repeatedly reaffirmed their broad commitment to police reform, all concrete efforts came to naught. In April 2008, the Bosnian parliament passed two police reform laws, but they effectively retained the decentralized police structures and only created additional weak supervisory

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institutions at the state level without much real power. The laws additional link all further police reforms to the constitutional changes which are arguably even more contested than changes to the police structure. The watered down version of police reformed allowed Bosnia to sign the SAA with the EU in June 2008 and essentially meant that the EU had backed down from its initial conditions. This failure of conditionality was a clear consequence of the lack of clear EU standards which it could have been legitimately upheld in Bosnia and the lack of commitment of the EU to the standards it had set in conjunction with the OHR.

The failure also links to some of the difficulties with other aspects of externally imposed police reform: Without the commitment of domestic political elites to reforms, changes are unlikely to occur or will remain superficial. The ‘carrot’ of EU accession was not large enough for Bosnian elites who know of the distance toward EU membership and the importance of policing for their own power. It would be mistaken to consider police reform through conditionality altogether impossible, but the experience suggest that ill-defined and in fact too specific requirements might backfire.

5. Conclusion

As this paper has demonstrated, there have been numerous efforts of international organizations and other third parties to shape, reform and change policing in former Yugoslavia. These efforts have lasted from a few months to over a decade and continue in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. The challenges underpinning the efforts are common to most aspects of post-conflict peace and state building.

First, how can reforms be successfully pursued against the will of local domestic political elites? Even when international actors engage in policing directly, local elites matter and can make and break such a policing effort. More importantly, long term reforms cannot be imposed externally: laws might be imposed, but their implementation inherently has to result from the political commitment of domestic actor. Support has, however, but often lacking or remained lukewarm.

Second, international organizations frequently display structural weaknesses in effectively engaging in civilian peace-building missions. The deployment gap has been particularly noticeable in the case of the different police missions. The delay in building up missions is not just a case of wasting time, it results in international organizations missing the ‘golden hour’ when security provision or assistance in the immediate aftermath of conflict sets the tone for the long-term evolution of the post-conflict reconstruction project. For example, if criminal groups are able to take hold in this period, it become more difficult later on to undo their influence. The lack of security in Kosovo during the crucial months following NATO victory has shaped relations between Albanians and Serbs until today, created the enclave structure into which Serbs withdrew and undermined trust of Serbs and other minorities in the effective security provision and guarantees by NATO and other international organizations.

Third, the often intrusive approach of external actors in domestic security provision can certainly be seen as being benign in intent, but it can also undermine not just citizen trust in the state which is instead placed in external security providers. It also
creates new power-relations which links citizens to external actors. More importantly, it is often unclear what agenda international police missions pursue. Most missions and international actors for example note the prevention of terrorism (after 2001) and drug smuggling as key priorities. These main concerns, however, appear to be driven by Western perceptions of the Western Balkans and more importantly by Western needs rather than domestic policing demands. While drugs have increasingly been posing a problem in the region itself, the prime risk perception of external intervention derives from the regions function as a transit route from drug producing countries to Western Europe. Similarly there has been little domestic terrorism, but the fear of terrorism fueled by extremist Islamist groups is primarily a concern for Western governments. In fact, the rule of law and Western fear of terrorism might in fact clash, as they did in Bosnia when the government was pressured by the US in early 2002, following 11 September 2001, to surrender six Algerian-born Bosnian citizens to Guantanamo without due process in Bosnia itself.

Fourth, “there is no agreement on what the standards of a democratic police system are.” As such, police reform does not have on clear goal and is rather about hitting a moving target. Consequently, international efforts have pushed countries in the region in very different directions: Macedonia had to decentralize the police after 2001, granting more power to municipalities, while Bosnia has been pressured to centralize and reduce the powers of sub-state units. These trends are not necessarily a contradiction: Macedonia’s police force before 2001 was highly centralized while Bosnia’s police was arguably too decentralized, lacking enough mechanisms for coordination across cantonal and entity boundaries. The absence of a clear standard has, however, undermined the EU’s conditionality over police reform in Bosnia and also expresses itself in a variety of approaches chosen by different countries. Practice varies greatly from unarmed British police officers to paramilitary policy units in Italy. Finally, reform of the police by international actors pose competing and at times contradictory demands on domestic actors. In both Macedonia and Bosnia, for example, reforms sought to reduce the overall number of police officers to bring the proportion to the population in line with European standards. At the same time, both countries had to increase the number of minority members in the police force. Similarly the push for rapid recruitment of minority members in Macedonia and South Serbia stood in conflict with the goal of a professionalization of the police as the short term training programs hardly provided for a sufficient education for a police officer.

69 Wilson, op. cit., p. 153.
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