GRIPS 政策研究センター Policy Research Center

客員研究員

2012/10/25 Report No:12-13

Does the NIMBY strategy really promote a self-interest?:Evidence from England’s waste management policy

著者
  • 山本 雅資富山大学
  • 吉田 雄一朗政策研究大学院大学
分野 経済学
言語 英語
要旨

NIMBY (not in my backyard) is the word used to describe the human behavior whereby a person agrees on an issue but refuses to accept it when it happens ‘in his own back yard’. This paper analyzes this type of NIMBY activity and, using evidence from England’s waste management policy, determines that NIMBY decisions are not necessarily the result of personal self-interest. If people disagree with building a nuisance facility, such as a site for waste and recyclables, in their own backyard, the result is an increase in illegal dumping rather than the legal and proper disposal of waste materials at an official facility. Using the spatial econometrics approach, we further provide evidence that the broken window theory is also applicable to illegal dumping.

キーワード Illegal Dumping, Spatial Econometrics, Waste Management, NIMBY
添付ファイル 12-13.pdf