

## The Defense Force Awakens

### -Japan's New Defense Policy and Its Implication for the Regional Security-

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#### Introduction

At the outset, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to this Institute, particularly Vice-President Yokomichi, for giving me this precious opportunity to deliver a speech at GRIPS Forum today on the national defense policy, for which I worked for a long time. It is a great honor for me to talk in front of the GRIPS community.

I know that many Americans and Europeans begin their remarks with one, and thus I wish I could say, "I have one." In accordance with the Japanese tradition, however, I would like to start with an apology today. Those of you who looked at the English version of the flyer of this event may have come here to hear a sequel of the popular Hollywood movie, but I am sorry that I do not intend to talk about a new episode of the space fantasy.

Japan is back under the strong leadership of Prime Minister Abe. It is in Japan that the force awakens. I do not talk about Skywalker today, but touch upon the sea-going officers in East Asia. I do not talk about Darkside of the Galaxy, but mention the dark side of globalization. I do not talk about First Order of the universe, but talk about the rules-based order of the world. I do not talk about balance of Force in the Galaxy, but discuss the balance of power in East Asia.

2015 was a year of great progress of the national security and defense policy of Japan. The Government of Japan established its institutional framework for national security, including the security

legislation in order to put the new interpretation of the Constitution in terms of use of force into practice and also including the revised “Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation.” However, we cannot enjoy mental holidays. In fact, we live in an acute security environment of East Asia.

The nuclear test and ballistic missile launches by North Korea and terrorist attacks in Jakarta at the beginning of this year and elsewhere in more recent time remind us of non-traditional security challenges again, but these post-modern challenges are not the only factors that characterize this region’s security environment. It is almost a cliché that we have to address traditional and non-traditional challenges simultaneously. We live in such an intricate situation.

East Asia is an engine of growth. According to James Mann’s famous book, “Rise of the Vulcans,” Dr. Paul Wolfowitz felt, when he became US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific in the early 1980s, that East Asia felt like “sunlight and fresh air” after his many years of dealing with the Middle East<sup>1</sup>. Now, we have more sunlight and fresh air. This notion is widely shared in today’s world. British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, who visited Tokyo in January, said in his recent article, “The world enters 2016 with some cause for trepidation. ... But we can be certain about two things: Asia Pacific remains a leading engine of global growth, and we are living in an Asian century.”<sup>2</sup> Rise of China and rapid growth of Southeast Asia greatly contribute to it.

Back in 1947, George F. Kennan thought that West Germany and Japan were the centers, respectively of the two great industrial

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<sup>1</sup> James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: the history of Bush’s war cabinet* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), the caption of a picture of Dr. Wolfowitz between p.170 and p.171.

<sup>2</sup> Philip Hammond, “Opinion: Britain in partnership with a secure and prosperous Asia,” *The Mainichi*, January 7, 2016 ([manichi.jp/English/articles/20160107/p2g/00m/0in/086000c](http://manichi.jp/English/articles/20160107/p2g/00m/0in/086000c))

complexes of East and West, that their recovery was essential to the restoration of stability in Europe and East Asia, and that Japan was more important than China as a potential factor in world-political developments. He says that Americans, laboring under the strange fascination that China seemed to exert at all times on American opinion, tended to exaggerate China's real importance and to underrate that of Japan<sup>3</sup>. In Kennan's mind, there were five centers of great industrial complexes in the world then, i.e. the US, the UK, Soviet Union, Germany and Japan. While two defeated nations, Germany and Japan, were included, China was not. In seventy years, the world is much different.

On the other hand, in 1989, almost at the end of the Cold War, Professor Masataka Kosaka of the University of Kyoto wrote, "There is a possibility that rapid rise of Japan will end up with something short-lived in the final stage of Pax Americana. At least, we cannot rule out the possibility that Japan will return to the position that corresponds to its original national power and get settled there, and that people will recall an episode of history that the majority of the Americans thought that the US was overtaken by Japan in economic terms."<sup>4</sup> More than a quarter century later now, contemporary Japanese may have mixed views on this.

Rise of Asia, particularly of China, and Japan's enhanced roles in international security – these two make a lot of difference in today's world.

Rise of China is a fact. As Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan of Singapore correctly said in his recent lecture, you would have to be

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<sup>3</sup> George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), pp. 368-374.

<sup>4</sup> Masataka Kosaka, *Gendaino Kokusai-seiji [International Politics of the Present Age]* (Tokyo: Kohdansha, 1989), p. 247. (The English interpretation of the quoted part is an informal one made by the speaker for this speech.)

living on another planet to deny the fact<sup>5</sup>. At the same time, Japan's emergence with new roles in order to more contribute to upholding the rules-based international order is also a fact. When I met with China's Admiral Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief of General Staff Department of PLA, on the margin of last year's Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, he gave me two small pamphlets, one of which is titled "China's Military Strategy," the English translation of China's white paper on defense. Back in Japan I found a surprising passage in it as follows: "Japan is sparing no effort to dodge the post-war mechanism, overhauling its military and security policies. Such development has caused grave concerns among other countries in the region."<sup>6</sup> This is wrong. I strongly wondered which other countries became concerned about it.

Well, without spending too much time for introduction, I would like to discuss the following three points today: First, the current shape of the order in this part of the world; second, the values of the Japan-US Alliance and the roles of Japan in international security terms; and third and finally, the recent development of the national security and defense policy of Japan.

### Current Shape of the Order in the Asia-Pacific and East Asia

First, I would like to discuss the regional order from the following four points of view: First, balance of power; second, shared values; third, the validity of international rules; and fourth, regional institution.

I will begin with balance of power in the region. Political

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<sup>5</sup> Bilahari Kausikan, "Dealing With an Ambiguous World – Lecture I: An Age Without Definition," *IPS-Nathan Lectures*, 29 January 2016, p.17.

<sup>6</sup> The fourth paragraph of "1. National Security Situation" of China's Military Strategy, 2015 by The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China (*Full Text: China's Military Strategy* (chinadaily.com.cn/China/2015-05/26/content\_20820628.htm))

scientists tell us that balance of power is a primary component of international order<sup>7</sup>. Let me refer to the situations of East Asian maritime domain for a while. History of the South China Sea highlights that China often advanced to that region, exploiting a power vacuum. Beginning at the occupation of half of the Paracel Islands in the 1950s after the French withdrawal from Indochina, China expanded also after the American withdrawal from Vietnam in the 70s, after the former Soviets reducing their military presence in Vietnam in the 80s, and after the American withdrawal from the Philippines in the 90s<sup>8</sup>. It is important to note that the Chinese are more violent in the South than in the East China Sea. One of the fundamental differences between the two seas is balance of power. Although Southeast Asian countries have been modernizing naval and air forces and improving law-enforcement capabilities, most of them are still weak. For example, the Philippines, having a serious confrontation with China now, focused on counterinsurgency campaigns for long, and its most modern naval ships are two former US Coast Guard cutters<sup>9</sup>. In Northeast Asia in contrast, Japan's Defense Forces and Coast Guard have considerable strength. On top of it, 38,000 US servicemen are stationed in Japan<sup>10</sup> and 28,500 in Korea<sup>11</sup> out of roughly 136,000 in the Asia-Pacific in total<sup>12</sup>. There is no permanent presence of the US military in Southeast Asia. I believe this is the major cause of the difference of China's behaviors in the two seas. Professor Kosaka says that man has a tendency to expand his power

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<sup>7</sup> Yuichi Hosoya, *Kokusai Chitsujo [International Order]*, (Tokyo: Chuohkohon-shinsha, 2012), p.38.

<sup>8</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan, *China's Activities in the South China Sea*, December 22, 2015 ([mod.go.jp/jp/approach/surround/pdf/ch\\_d\\_act\\_20151222e.pdf](http://mod.go.jp/jp/approach/surround/pdf/ch_d_act_20151222e.pdf))

<sup>9</sup> Dakota L. Wood, ed., *2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength*, (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2015), p.120.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p.113.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p.114.

<sup>12</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Bouei Hakusho 2015 [Defense White Paper]*, p.14.

unless challenged by counter-balancing efforts<sup>13</sup>.

We have to restore the balance of power in our favor. Military is only one component of national power. Power is not simply military or economic. Power has diverse dimensions. Overall comprehensive strength of power is more important than the strength of individual aspect of power. Look at the US. As Ambassador Kausikan explains, the US is at the pinnacle of the international hierarchy of power in almost every dimension of power and it is likely to remain there<sup>14</sup>. We should not underrate the real power of the US. We should not be overshadowed by the cliché of “a declining US.” As different dimensions of national power perform different functions, we have to well devise how to utilize national power in the most effective and efficient way. In my view that is one of the reasons why a whole-of-government approach, or “All Japan” approach if I may use the term coined by a group of Japanese young scholars<sup>15</sup>, or a “full-spectrum approach” if I use the term in the British National Security Strategy<sup>16</sup>, is highlighted. This approach should be more emphasized.

My second point is shared values. International order is not based on balance of power alone. Shared values are also indispensable for a sustainable order, because it is not machinery but man that establishes order. We see a lot of democracies in East Asia today. Southeast Asians recently established ASEAN Community based on the principles of liberty, democracy and the rule of law. According to ASEAN Community Vision 2025, ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) aims at realizing an inclusive

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<sup>13</sup> Kosaka, *op.cit.*, p.233.

<sup>14</sup> Kausikan, *op.cit.*, p.8.

<sup>15</sup> Yuji Uesugi, Hiromi Fujishige, Tomonori Yoshizaki, and Tomoaki Honda, ed., *Sekaini Muketa All Japan [All Japan toward the world]* (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 2016)

<sup>16</sup> *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom*, p.6.

and responsive community that ensures the peoples enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as thrive in accordance with the principles of democracy, good governance and the rule of law. Even communist Vietnam belongs to this community, which means that these values are common in this region today, and I am sure it is a basis of the regional dynamism.

Professor Kosaka suggests, quoting Denis Brogan, that we tend to choose these values and a way of life based on these values, often called American way of life, when we have freedom to choose<sup>17</sup>. This is another aspect of American power and leadership, whether you would like to admit it or not.

Now, my third point is rules. It is easy to say that international law is not equipped with tools of enforcement. It is true that the international legal order is lack of an overarching mechanism to enforce. However, it is more important that the international community accepts the legally-binding nature of international norms and also the concept of state responsibility for unlawful acts by sovereign states.

In my understanding, most international rules were observed. At least, they have regulated sovereign states' behaviors in some way or another for centuries. Let me give you an old example related to East Asian maritime security. During the Napoleonic Wars, the Dutch West India Company chartered neutral American vessels to avoid British interference in their Nagasaki trade. In 1799 and in 1801, Captains of Salem, Massachusetts of the Salem-built ships, the Franklin and the Margaret, brought back lacquerware and other properties to the US<sup>18</sup>. It was half a century in advance of

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<sup>17</sup> Kosaka, *op.cit.*, pp.214-215.

<sup>18</sup> This description is based on the response of Phillips Library of Peabody Museum of Salem, Massachusetts to the inquiry of the speaker in 1996.

Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan and roughly the same period as the time when an American ship, the Empress of China, sailed to Canton to inaugurate American commercial ties with China. We can see even in this small episode those people's confidence in international laws of war. As we live in a more advanced age, I hope that the international community shares the notion that we are bound by the established norms of international law. The underlying precept is very simple: Agreements are binding. Freedom of navigation is just one of them.

Now, I would like to rush to my fourth point: regional institution. Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan of Singapore says, "It has been a quarter century since the Berlin Wall came down and the USSR imploded, yet we can still only define our times by reference to the age that preceded it; we still call this "the post-Cold War". We live in an age without definition."<sup>19</sup>

However, it is also true that the security system generated in the Cold War environment in this region works now. It is so-called "hub-&-spokes" system, which is a set of the bilateral alliance relations between the US on the one hand and regional states such as Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines on the other. This system has been underpinning the prosperity of this region for years. The pivotal role of the US is undeniable, as it is the US that provides robust power and way of life to the region through this system.

If this system is expected to function for a considerable time in future, then the most realistic, valid, efficient, and risk-free way to ensure security will be to make this system more sustainable. Japan enjoys the benefit of the stability this system generates. Japan is not a challenger to the order established on it. Japan is definitely in a

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<sup>19</sup> Kausikan, *op.cit.*, p.7.



position to enhance it.

If we used our imagination, we might think of other alternatives such as a more integrated overarching multilateral system, similar to what we can see in Europe. In due course we would possibly have to think about such things squarely. We should not spare efforts to help possible candidates for future systems such as ASEAN-based institutions, e.g. ADMM-Plus grow, but for the foreseeable future we may want to be more realistic about the regional integration on security.

### Values of the Japan-US Alliance and the Roles of Japan

Now that I have discussed the US-centered hub-&-spokes system, I would like to move on to the third part of my remarks: Values of the Japan-US Alliance and the roles of Japan. There are two points here: First, the centrality of the Japan-US Alliance in the regional system; and second, tyranny of distance.

First, the centrality of the Japan-US Alliance in the hub-&-spokes system. There are three points here: One, shared values; two, shared perception on the security environment; and three, shared presence of US forces.

Now, needless to say, both countries share fundamental political values. As reiterated in many bilateral statements between the two countries including the Security Treaty of 1960 and the Joint Declaration on Security of 1996, the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law are the very basis of the bilateral tie.

Next, shared perception on the security situations also contributes to the central nature of our bilateral alliance in the hub-&-spokes system. Japan's position in international security is very unique. This country geographically neighbors with two nuclear powers, Russia and China. It also neighbors with Korean Peninsula,

on which North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as delivery means of weapons of mass destruction. North Korea's link to Iran also needs vigilance. North Korea's Nodong missile looks like Iran's Shahab III missile, which causes a serious doubt that Nodong itself or its technology was transferred from North Korea to Iran.<sup>20</sup> International terrorism is also a serious concern. Those non-traditional threats do not notice any national borders. They spread wherever deterrence is inadequate. ISIL declared Japanese nationals as targets of their terror in early last year<sup>21</sup>. In this sense, Japan shares with the US 5 points, i.e. China, Russia, North Korea, Iran and international terrorism as sources of threat or concern. Japan is the only US ally in the region and probably in the world that shares all these five as common concerns. This shared scope is something that highlights the importance of the Japan-US security tie.

Finally, shared presence of US forces is also relevant to the centrality of the Japan-US Alliance. 38,000 US military personnel in Japan include a forward-deployed carrier battle group centered on USS Ronald Reagan, an amphibious assault ship at Yokosuka and the bulk of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF)<sup>22</sup>. This fact clearly shows that Japan is the only democracy in this region sustaining large and stable US military presence as an integral part of the US policy of rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific.

My second point, tyranny of distance, is exactly relevant to this point. The US as the center piece of the regional security is geographically remote. The US is right in saying that it has been and will remain a Pacific power<sup>23</sup>, but it is not a part of Asia. Even in the

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<sup>20</sup> Ministry of Defense of Japan, *Bouei Hakusho 2015*, p.23.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p.110.

<sup>22</sup> Dakota, *op.cit.*, p.113.

<sup>23</sup> The White House, *National Security Strategy* (February 2015), p.24.

age of advanced technology such as information technology and unmanned technology, and also longer-range power projection capability, tyranny of distance will still be a problem. For example, the distance between the South China Sea and San Diego, the home of US 3rd Fleet is 6,700NM, which is around 4 times as long as the distance between the South China Sea and Tokyo, and nearly 7 times as long as the distance between that sea area and Okinawa. It takes 2 to 3 weeks by sea. Even Hawaii, the home of US Pacific Command is 5,000NM away from the South China Sea. It takes 10 to 13 days by steam<sup>24</sup>. US military presence in this region in peace time will continue to be indispensable. Thus, it is Japan's own business to keep up and more strengthen its alliance relationship with the US and to enhance the credibility of US extended deterrence toward Japan and toward its Asian allies.

Alliance cannot be strong without strong allies<sup>25</sup>. Japan must be strong. Japan must keep committed to go through with the defense of its territory in this acute environment. At the same time, Japan as a whole must be strong. Also, it must be attractive and communicative to the world so that it can convey the right message about its security policy orientation regionally and globally. Not only Japan but also the US must be strong. We have been exposed to a stereotyped view of "declining US" too often, but we should recall the resilience of the US as the source of its abiding energy and power. The US must convince those sceptics in this region of its resilience by their own words and deeds now and in the next administration no matter who the next president of the US will be.

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<sup>24</sup> Dakota, *op.cit.*, p.121.

<sup>25</sup> Study Group on Grand Design of the U.S.-Japan Alliance at a New Stage, *U.S.-Japan Joint Policy Report Grand Design of the U.S.-Japan Alliance at a New Stage: As a Protector of a Liberal, Open, Rule-based International Order in the "Era of Smart Power"*, (Tokyo: The Japan Forum on International Relations, 2015), p.8.

## Recent Development of Japan's National Security and Defense Policy

Now, my final point. The two achievements of last year, i.e. the security legislation and the new “Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation” are epoch-making, but it would be wrong to end up with simply establishing a declaratory policy. The Japanese have to capitalize on the current momentum to enhance their security capabilities.

Japanese public opinion polls show that the public is still doubtful of the validity of the security legislation although the support rates seem slightly increasing<sup>26</sup>. Lots of Japanese constitutional scholars argue that the legislation is unconstitutional. If the defense forces have to operate without strong support and understanding of the public, they will not be able to perform their missions with confidence. It would be very unfortunate for the future of Japan and the region.

So, persistent efforts to remove misunderstandings and to win a large public support of the legislation are indispensable. Back in April 1991, when the Japanese Government sent minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the opposition to sending the ships was huge among the Japanese public. Also, in the next few years when Japan participated in the UN peace-keeping in Cambodia, by establishing so-called PKO Law, we saw again a huge split of the public opinion. A quarter century has passed since then. Today I do not see any major opposition to the Japanese participation in the peace-keeping in South Sudan or in the counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. I hope that likewise the public will understand the real value of the legislation in good faith.

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<sup>26</sup> A material by the Ministry of Defense of Japan for the Ministry's Symposium held on February 29, 2016, “Heiwa Anzen Hoseino Gaiyo [Outline of the Peace and Security Legislation]”, p.1.

Having said so, public understanding is not taken for granted. National security policy in democracies must rest on firm consensus among the public<sup>27</sup>. Without robust public support, any security policy cannot be credible or sustainable enough to generate necessary deterrence against anything. The history of Japan's defense policy in the past seventy years is a history of tremendous efforts to try to obtain public support for its defense forces. There has been no period when public support is sought so earnestly as the present.

As time is limited, I would like to discuss the values of those two achievements: the security legislation and the Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines.

First, the security legislation. Here, I would like to discuss it in the following two dimensions: One, revolution vs. evolution; and two, competition vs. cooperation.

One, revolution vs. evolution. The security legislation allows Japan to use its force to exercise the right to collective self-defense, which the Japanese Government kept saying for many years that was unconstitutional. Although it is a sea change, it is not a revolutionary but an evolutionary conversion in the face of globalization. China's defense white paper is probably right in saying that it overhauled Japan's national security policy, but it is completely wrong in arguing that the legislation was an effort to dodge the post-war mechanism. The conversion has been made within the long-established policy of strictly defense-oriented military posture. The purpose is to demonstrate Japan's strong resolve to its defense and to more contribute to the rules-based global order. It is not Japan but some other countries that are trying to unilaterally alter the order with force and coercion.

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<sup>27</sup> Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan of Singapore says the same thing about foreign policy in his lecture cited in Note 5. See Kausikan, *op.cit.*, p.2.

It would not be overstating to say that it is a natural logical conclusion drawn from the National Security Strategy of 2013. The new laws derive exactly from the two principles enshrined in the strategy: First, strong determination to go through with the defense of Japan's territory no matter what; and second, proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation. These two guiding principles, particularly the second one, are based on the notion that no one country can ensure its own national security all by itself in today's increasingly interconnected world.

This notion is relevant particularly to the international life of Japan. Japan, surrounded by the sea, depend its prosperity on maritime trade. Robert D. Kaplan's famous book, "Asia's Cauldron" begins with a suggestive statement: "Europe is a landscape; East Asia a seascape."<sup>28</sup> In the past we could enjoy "stopping power of water"<sup>29</sup> but now we have to pay more attention to connecting power of water. In this sense, I could argue that the security legislation means a lot to maritime security of Japan.

This point leads my discussion to the second dimension of the security legislation: competition vs. cooperation. The new legislation is a great contribution to the enhancement of Japan's defense posture. In this general sense, it will help enhance deterrence against Chinese unjust maritime expansion in East Asia and also help keep the tension under control in a lower level. As China, being a land power, expands to the maritime domain, buffer between China and the maritime powers in the region is narrower than before, which means, according to an American expert of China, that political and military buffer between crisis and clash is becoming narrower. Said so, China is not a sworn adversary, different from the Soviet Union in the Cold War

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<sup>28</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron* (New York: Random House, 2014), p.5.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p.7.

days<sup>30</sup>. Interdependence with China is a fact of life for all of us. From this view-point, you will see another aspect in the security laws. They provide important instruments for security cooperation with China, e.g. in UN peace-keeping, non-combatant evacuation operations, and possibly even in logistics support in legitimate international operations such as in counter-terrorism. I do not imagine that Japan will go to armed conflicts with China over the South China Sea issues, by exercising the right to collective self-defense. The East China Sea issue is not necessarily relevant to that right, either. The Senkaku Island issue is a matter of individual defense. You cannot explain the real substance of the legislation for the deterrence purpose alone.

Now, a similar dichotomy can be applied to the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation. It is also about competition vs. cooperation. However, before talking about this, I would like to discuss what “the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation” are about for a moment.

In short, the Guidelines document is a bilateral policy declaration to define the division of labor between the two militaries to effectively manage the alliance relationship based on the security treaty of 1960. The Guidelines were established first in 1978 in the midst of the Cold War era, and then revised in 1997 to adapt the relationship to the post-Cold War environment surrounding both countries. The revision of last April, the second renewal, was done in order to define the new shape of the alliance in the increasingly globalized world.

Although the latest revision tends to be discussed only in the context of the Japanese security legislation, in fact it has more meat in it. If you focused on the collective defense issue alone, you would miss more important points. There are, in my mind, five major values in

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<sup>30</sup> Mira Rapp Hooper, “Unchartered Waters: Extended Deterrence and Maritime Disputes,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.38, No.1 (Spring 2015), pp.128, 130.

the new Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation.

First, the Guidelines provide the political and military framework for contingency planning to military planners of both countries. This is the original role of the first Guidelines of 1978. The first document was established in order to implement US commitment to the defense of Japan in accordance with Article 5 of the security treaty by contingency planning efforts in peace time. This original role remains the core of the newest Guidelines. In addition, the newest revision has expanded the scope to include other types of operation. On this weekend I have heard that the US is offering its helping hands for the earthquake disaster relief in Kyushu with military lift capability. This will provide another great opportunity of bilateral “cooperation in response to a large-scale disaster in Japan” based on the new Guidelines.

Second, the Guidelines are a catalyst to help Japan establish its own crisis and contingency response mechanism. Just recall several legislative achievements of Japan at the turn of the century, including a law to allow Japan to provide logistics support to US forces in “situations in areas surrounding Japan” and a set of legislation to deal with contingencies, as results of the Guidelines of 1997. This time, the Guidelines review process went side by side with the reinterpretation process of the Constitution leading up to the said legislation of last year.

Third, the Guidelines indicate the shape of the alliance in each era, by which the Guidelines serve as an important tool of strategic communications to Japan’ neighbors. This role was highlighted in 1997, because we had seen tensions in Taiwan straits and North Korean provocations just before the 1997 version of the Guidelines. This role is more relevant to the most recent revision, as the Chinese seem to discuss the Japan-US Alliance and the security legislation as



one set and express their concerns to both as in their Military Strategy pamphlet, which I referred to before.

Fourth, the revised Guidelines are designed to serve as the comprehensive framework of the alliance management on the deterrence aspect of the partnership. This is a new role of the Guidelines. The previous two Guidelines focused on operational cooperation alone, but in fact the bilateral security and defense cooperation is more than operations today. Many other types of cooperation such as intelligence, weaponry, technology, research, and education are increasingly thriving. Without encompassing all of them, alliance management would be inadequate.

Fifth and finally, the new Guidelines are also designed to work as guidance for regional cooperation among the partners at the tips of the hub-&-spokes system beyond simple bilateral cooperation between Japan and the US. This is the other new role of the Guidelines. It will also facilitate progress of trilateral partnerships such as Japan-US-Australia and Japan-US-South Korea, progress of other bilateral relations such as Australia-Japan, and South Korea-Japan, and even multilateral cooperation such as ASEAN-Japan, and even NATO-Japan beyond geography. In the age in which diverse interests of respective countries intertwine with each other intricately, a closer networking for common security is worthy of huge investment.

This effort aims at strengthening the deterrent of the Alliance, and in this sense, it is a part of larger efforts to restore regional balance of power in our advantage against China. However, similar to the security legislation, the Guidelines are also equipped with tools of cooperation with China. Partnership with third parties having common interests must be strengthened. There is no reason for either Japan or the US to limit the third parties to the US allies at the tips of the spokes. If China is interested in being united under the banner of

common security, China should not be excluded. It is not a fantasy. China has been participating in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden for years. We should encourage China to join us in many other efforts for common security.

However, the Chinese have a different view. Their comments about the alliance are summarized as follows: First, alliance is a relic from the past and against the stream of the world; and second, the Japan-US Alliance must be limited to strictly bilateral scope and must not damage the interests of any third parties<sup>31</sup>. I argue that it is not Japan but China that is still Cold War minded. Japan-US Alliance was given new rationales already in 1996 to adapt to the post-Cold War environment. It is natural for any nations with shared values and interests to get united. Actually, as far as I remember, we got the same comments from China in 1997 when Japan and the US worked out the previous Guidelines. I would also argue that they should look back at the history of Japan since 1997 in good faith to see how much the strengthened alliance relationship has contributed to the regional stability during those years.

### Conclusion

Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I have tried your patience for too long this afternoon. So, let me conclude with a brief summary of what I have tried to achieve today. The US remains in the center of the security system of this region, and the leading role of the US for sustainable regional stability is undeniable. In the meanwhile, there are not many things that the US can do all by itself to maintain the stability. Networking for international cooperation is increasingly important.

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<sup>31</sup> *Sankei News*, April 30, 2015.  
([sankei.com/world/news/150430/wor1504300016-n1.html](http://sankei.com/world/news/150430/wor1504300016-n1.html))

This region is not multipolar or bipolar. The hub-&-spokes system remains the key ingredient of the regional security. The Japan-US Alliance is the most integral part of the regional system. Japan has a lot of legitimate stake in upholding the system. In order to keep spinning the wheel, its hub must be resilient, its spokes must be strong, and the rim of the wheel, too, must be strong. The Japan-US Alliance as the key spoke of the regional wheel must continue to be robust. In order for the bilateral Alliance to keep strong, both allies must be strong in every sense of the word. Japan's security efforts must be appropriately placed in the overall picture of such endeavor.

Let me truly conclude with a statement like a seagoing officer. We have three ships now: US leadership, partnership among US regional allies of course including Japan, and friendship with other like-minded countries in and even beyond the region. If we succeed in navigating these three great ships, we can definitely address three formidable ships: hardship, dictatorship and brinkmanship in this promising region.

I stop here, and once again, thank you very much for this wonderful opportunity and for your patience.

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