GRIPS 政策研究センター Policy Research Center


2008/11/28 Report No:08-17

Expanding Choice in School Choice

  • Atila AbdulkadirogluDepartment of Economics, Duke University
  • Yeon-Koo CheDepartment of Economics, Columbia University
  • 安田 洋祐政策研究大学院大学
分野 経済学
言語 英語

Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley’s deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to in uence how they are treated in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a greater scope of inefficiency.

キーワード Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm, choice-augmented deferred acceptance, tie breaking, ex ante Pareto efficiency.
添付ファイル 08-17.pdf